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Wage and Job Risk for Workers
John A. Turner
“No-cut contracts are history.  Permanent jobs are long gone.  Job
security is a thing of the past.” (Calgary Herald, February 18,
1996)
Many Canadians and Americans believe that job insecurity has
increased, with ties of loyalty between employers and employees
weakening.  This opinion has been expressed during the late 1990s in
the Canadian and American press as well as by politicians in both
countries. Public opinion polls in the United States have shown that
workers believe job insecurity has increased (Schmidt 1999).
Inspired by popular concern, economists have begun investigating
this question.  More studies have examined labor markets in the United
States than in Canada.  The evidence from the studies has been mixed.
In recent years, most insights of economics concerning employ-
ment, unemployment, and wage determination have resulted from an
implicit contract approach.  This approach is based on the presumption
that long-term relationships between workers and firms enhance pro-
ductivity for many skilled jobs.  Part of the implicit contract may be the
promise that firms bear some risks for workers—sheltering workers
from employment and wage effects of shifts in supply and demand, at
least for shifts up to a certain magnitude and expected duration.  Job
insecurity could increase if the implicit contract has shifted risk from
firms to workers. 
Alternatively, with no change in implicit contracts, job insecurity
could increase because of greater macroeconomic fluctuations or
greater inherent instability in the labor market.  Some analysts have
suggested that workers have less job security than in the past because
of rapidly changing technology and increased competition due to
deregulation and the growing importance of international trade.  The
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result has been downsizing by firms and flattening of management
structures.
This chapter examines whether job and wage insecurity have
increased in Canada and the United States.  Aspects of job insecurity
are discussed for Canada and the United States separately and then
compared.  The chapter examines empirical evidence over the past sev-
eral decades to gain insights on the causes of job insecurity.   It also
examines more recent empirical studies to assess changes in job inse-
curity during the 1990s.  Both cyclical and long-term causes of job
insecurity are assessed.  The chapter concludes that, by some standard
measures, the increase in job insecurity has been slight.  A closer
examination, however, indicates a hidden increase.  Job insecurity
measured as involuntary job separations has clearly increased for some
groups.  Moreover, the increase in the cost of job insecurity may have
been considerable because the job loss has been particularly costly for
the people affected.  
CANADA
Macroeconomic Instability
Greater job insecurity could result from greater instability in the
macroeconomy.  Evidence from past decades may shed light on the
mechanisms.
Altonji and Ham (1987) examined the hypothesis that the aggre-
gate economy in Canada was more unstable in the 1970s and early
1980s than in the 1960s, focusing on the variance of aggregate Cana-
dian employment growth.  They compared that variance over the peri-
ods of 1963–1970 and 1972–1982.  They examined the effects of
shocks arising from the U.S. economy, as well as other shocks to the
Canadian national economy, particular industries, and provinces.  They
found that changes in U.S. GNP dominated, accounting for 65 percent
of the variance in Canadian employment growth.  The variance in
national employment growth doubled in the 1970s and early 1980s as
compared with the 1960s.  The increases in the variances of various
shocks, largely the increase in the variance of the U.S. GNP, led to the
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greater instability of aggregate Canadian employment growth in the
1970s and early 1980s.  Thus, their findings suggest a causal link
between labor market instability in the United States and Canada and
an increase in labor market instability in both countries.
Job Turnover
Greater instability of aggregate employment growth could lead to
greater job instability for workers.  Several types of statistics can be
used to indicate whether job instability has increased.  These include
data on job tenure, job retention rates, job turnover, and part-year work.
These measures can be divided into two general types: those that mea-
sure how long individuals have worked in a particular job and those
that more directly measure employer-induced job instability.    
Job instability most simply could be measured as the probability
that a worker would terminate a job (quit or be laid off) during a
period.  This measure of job instability indicates the amount of job
change in the economy but does not indicate the degree of job risk or
insecurity a worker faces.  When conditions in the labor market are
favorable, workers are more likely to change jobs voluntarily.    
In the 1980s, the average annual job turnover rate in Canada was
4.1 percentage points higher than it was in the previous decade.  In the
period of 1973–1979, the annual turnover of jobs averaged 20.5 per-
cent in Canada, as compared with 24.6 percent during 1980–1990.  The
increase during the 1980s was due to an increase in both job growth
and job loss, indicating that restructuring had become more important
than cyclical factors (Baldwin and Rafiquzzaman 1996).  
More recent work finds that both short and long (over 11 years)
duration jobs increased over the period of 1979–1991 but there was lit-
tle change in average duration (Green and Riddle 1997).  The move-
ment toward longer duration jobs has occurred mainly among women
and appears to be due to the greater labor force commitment of married
women.  Green and Riddle found little change in the likelihood of long
job tenure among older males, with the exception of a slight decrease
in the 55–64 age range, which is perhaps attributable to some men
truncating their job tenure by taking early retirement.  Green and Rid-
dle’s work, at least up to the start of the 1990s, thus did not indicate an
increase in overall job instability in Canada.  However, they did find
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evidence of greater job instability for young and less educated workers
and suggested that skill-biased technological change might be one
explanation.
In an important paper, Baker and Solon (1999) used longitudinal
Canadian income tax data reported by employers to measure earnings
instability among Canadian men over the period of 1976–1992.  They
found growth in earnings instability over the period.  The large size of
their earnings panel allowed them to estimate and test richer models of
earnings dynamics than could be supported by the relatively small
panel surveys used in U.S. research.  The Canadian data strongly reject
several restrictions commonly imposed in the U.S. literature, and they
suggest that imposing these restrictions may overstate the importance
of earnings instability.   
Unemployment
Job risk is affected by the expected duration and cost of unemploy-
ment.  The unemployed in Canada faced quite different conditions in
the recession of 1990–1992 than in the recession of 1981–1982 (Corak
1993).  Workers who lost their jobs in the 1990s experienced longer
spells of unemployment than workers did in the 1980s.      
Older unemployed individuals fared considerably worse during the
Canadian recession of the early 1990s, while younger individuals fared
better.  Workers age 45 years and older experienced longer expected
average completed unemployment spells in 1992 (26.2 weeks) than in
1983 (22.8 weeks).  Thus, the changing pattern of unemployment risk
may cause greater job insecurity in Canada.  As discussed next, how-
ever, some changes in the pattern of Canadian unemployment may be
due to changes in unemployment compensation.
The Effects of Government Programs: Unemployment Insurance
The unemployment system in Canada in the late 1990s may have
increased job instability while possibly increasing economic security.
The system has given rise to the expression “lotto 10/42”—after 10
weeks of work, workers qualify for 42 weeks of unemployment insur-
ance benefits.  This aspect of unemployment insurance may account for
the seemingly contradictory experience that both workforce participa-
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tion and unemployment increased from 1972 to 1992 (Lemieux and
MacLeod 1999).  Both employers and employees presumably have
learned how to use the unemployment system to subsidize part-year
work.  The Canadian unemployment system apparently has led to a sig-
nificant increase in the flows into and out of the labor force in order to




Because job instability is closely tied to the business cycle,
increasing during downturns, changes in the business cycle may have
an important effect on long-term changes in job stability.  Conventional
measures of the U.S. business cycle indicate that the average expan-
sions since World War II have been twice as long as they were in the
pre-war period and contractions have been half as long.  Watson (1994)
suggested three possible explanations for these trends.  First, shocks to
the economy have been smaller in the post-war period, possibly as a
result of either fortuitous economic change or effective government
policies dampening the effect of exogenous shocks.  Second, the com-
position of output has shifted from cyclical to less cyclical sectors.
Third, the apparent stabilization is largely spurious, caused by the way
that pre-war and post-war business cycle reference dates were chosen
by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).  He presented
evidence suggesting that the third explanation is the cause, largely due
to the poor quality of data in the pre-war period.  He concluded, how-
ever, that while business cycle downturns have remained constant in
average length when calculated using a consistent methodology, their
amplitude has decreased.  His study, however, predates the record-
breaking economic expansion of the 1990s and early 2000s.
Other analysts have found diminished cyclical macroeconomic
fluctuations in the post-war period in the major economies of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
including the United States and Canada (Bordo, Jonung, and Bergman
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1998).  This has been interpreted as evidence that counter-cyclical pol-
icy has been more effective in the post World War II period than before.
An additional explanation is that increased integration of the world
economy mitigates the negative influence of any one country’s disrup-
tions on other countries.  The correlations among real output in 13
advanced countries have increased over time, suggesting a more inte-
grated world economy (Bordo, Jonung, and Bergman 1998).
Changes in macroeconomic stability affect job stability but are
only part of the causes of overall job stability.  Most plant- and estab-
lishment-level employment fluctuations are idiosyncratic and are not
explainable by macroeconomic or sectoral shocks (Dunne, Roberts,
and Samuelson 1989).                                                                                           
Fluctuations in Wage Rates 
The United States has traditionally been considered to have down-
wardly inflexible wages.  In comparison to Japan and Great Britain, for
example, it has been considered to have less flexible wages and more
flexible employment (Gordon 1982).  When wage rates are flexible,
shocks that might cause job loss can be absorbed through wage rate
reductions.  Thus, changes in wage flexibility affect employment sta-
bility, but they may also be affected by changes in the underlying vola-
tility of demand for labor.
While low inflation is a goal of macroeconomic policy, moderate
inflation may provide a degree of flexibility in real wages when nomi-
nal wage rates are downwardly inflexible.  A very low rate of inflation
may thus reduce the ability of firms to adjust their compensation levels
in responses to fluctuations in demand.  With the rapid U.S. inflation of
the 1970s, firms could deal with competitive pressures by granting
nominal wage increases below the rate of inflation, thereby reducing
real costs without nominal wage cuts or layoffs (Levy and Murnane
1992).  The low inflation of the mid and late 1990s could be a source of
greater job instability because that form of real wage adjustment is
greatly reduced.
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Earnings Instability
One dimension of labor market instability is instability in earnings.
Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) used the Michigan Panel Study on
Income Dynamics to examine instability in annual earnings.  They
examined a sample of white males ages 20–59 over the years 1970–
1988.  They determined permanent earnings by calculating an age-
earnings profile for each worker and then calculating transitory earn-
ings in each period as the difference between actual earnings and the
predicted earnings of the worker’s age-earning profile.  They further
decomposed transitory earnings into transitory fluctuations of real
weekly wages and annual weeks of work.  Comparing earnings
between 1970–1978 and 1979–1987, they found that the transitory
variances of both real weekly earnings and annual weeks of work had
increased.  Roughly half of the increase in the variance of transitory
earnings was due to an increase in the variance of weekly earnings.
The percentage of men with large transitory fluctuations rose particu-
larly dramatically.  
Nonunionized workers had substantially higher transitory vari-
ances in earnings than unionized workers, suggesting that the shift
away from unionization is part of the reason for the increase.  The tran-
sitory variances for both groups increased, however, in the period of
1979–1987.  Similarly, the shift out of manufacturing and into service
and trade jobs accounted for part of the increase, but 88 percent of the
increase was due to changes within industry (including changes in
unionization) rather than changes in industry composition.  Before the
early 1980s, the variance of transitory earnings for job stayers showed
no clear trend.  However, by the 1980s, fluctuations in transitory earn-
ings were higher for both job stayers and movers.  All age and educa-
tion groups had increased variance in transitory earnings, but the
increase was greatest among the least educated men.  In sum, the
increase in earnings instability is a broad phenomenon, affecting most
labor force groups. 
Gottschalk and Moffitt found that much of the increase in earnings
instability in the 1980s was associated with large increases in job-
changing rates.  This finding is inconsistent with other studies that used
data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and are discussed later.
They suggested that the difference between their study and other stud-
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ies may be a result of differences in the wording of the questions asked
in the surveys and in the samples and years covered.
Commenting on their study, Katz (1994) noted that declines in
unionization and in the real minimum wage may account for an
increase in earnings instability for low-educated workers.   In another
study, Katz and Krueger (1991) found that deregulated industries
appeared to have large increases in earnings variation.  
Job Instability
In the mid and late 1990s, a large number of empirical studies
focusing on the U.S. labor market addressed the question of whether
job instability had increased.  The studies primarily focused on the
descriptive issue of whether job insecurity has increased, while not
addressing the more difficult issue of why changes in job insecurity
have occurred.
Studies of job tenure and job separations have been reviewed by
Schmidt and Svorny (1998) and by Marcotte (1995).  Some of the con-
flicting findings can be reconciled due to differences in the following:
the way survey questions were asked, the treatment of nonresponses,
the length of the lookback period over which the respondent provided
information, sample selection, or the point in the business cycle when
the data were collected.  This survey does not attempt to reconcile the
conflicting findings, but rather focuses on the areas of general agree-
ment.
Job tenure
Aggregate labor market statistics provide little support for the
widespread perception that job instability in the United States has
increased.  Data from the CPS show that the average length of time
workers have been with their current employer has declined slightly
over the past decade.  Among wage and salary workers, median tenure
was 3.9 years in January 1987, 4.1 years in January 1991, 3.8 years in
February 1996, and 3.6 years in February 1998 (U.S. Department of
Labor 1999b).
Similarly, there has been little overall change in the percentage of
the workforce with long tenure (Table 2.1).  A study examining data
from both the CPS and from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
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(PSID), however, concluded that there was a statistically significant
increase in the probability of workers having less than 10 years of ten-
ure in both data sets over the 1980s through the mid 1990s (Jaeger and
Stevens 1999).
Table 2.1 Tenure Statistics for Workers Age 20 and Over with Long 
Tenure, 1983–1998 (% of workforce) 
Tenure
Worker category 10–19 years 20 or more years
All workers
1983 18.0  8.9
1987 17.9   8.5
1991 18.9   9.4
1996 17.6   9.5








1983 15.9   4.9
1987 17.0   4.9
1991 18.2   6.5
1997 17.4   7.2
1998 17.9   7.4
SOURCE: Employee Benefit Research Institute compilation of U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics data (Employee Benefit Research Institute 1999).
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 Tenure statistics show an increase in tenure for women and a
decrease for men (Schmidt and Svorny 1998).  The findings for women
probably reflect the greater labor force attachment of women over time
and thus may reflect a change in women’s labor force behavior rather
than a change in the inherent stability of their jobs.  The turnover rate
for women has become more like that of men as their labor force par-
ticipation generally has become more like that of men.   
Job insecurity has also increased for older males.  Median tenure
for males in age groups above age 40 has declined considerably, from
14.8 years in 1983 for men age 50–54 to 12.8 in 1991.  The proportion
with tenure greater than 10 years, another measure indicating long-
term job relationships, has also declined for men age 40 and older.
Median tenure declined in all educational groups within this age group,
and other measures of job stability for this group also declined.  In con-
trast, median tenure generally rose for age groups of women above age
40 (U.S. Department of Labor 1995b).  Thus, the increase in job stabil-
ity for women, possibly reflecting their labor force attachment rather
than employer-side changes, may be masking an increase in job insta-
bility in aggregate labor force statistics.
Statistics on tenure for jobs in progress do not reflect eventual job
tenure.  Hall (1972, 1982) did the seminal work on estimating the dis-
tribution of eventual job tenure.  His work was extended by Ureta
(1992).
Job turnover and job retention rates
Swinnerton and Wial (1995) used CPS data to measure four-year
job retention rates and showed that, on average, workers with no col-
lege education had a decline in the probability of keeping the same job
for four years when comparing 1977–1983 to 1987–1991.  Using the
PSID, Marcotte (1994) found a similar result, as did Rose (1995) and
Farber (1995).  
Neumark, Polsky, and Hansen (1999) updated earlier work by cal-
culating four-year retention rates using the 1995 CPS.  They found that
job stability declined modestly during the first half of the 1990s.  The
measured decline was reduced by the workforce shifting toward older
ages in which jobs are typically more stable.  While older workers tend
to have more stable jobs, they found declines in job stability especially
Wage and Job Risk for Workers 29
for older, more tenured workers; they also found greater declines for
blacks than whites, and for men than women. 
All evidence indicates an increase in job instability for black work-
ers (Marcotte 1995).  Swinnerton and Wial (1995) reported an overall
decline in four-year retention rates for nonwhites from 1979–1983 to
1989–1993.  Supporting results were also found by Diebold et al.
(1996) and Rose (1995).
Several studies have found a decline in job stability for less-edu-
cated and low-income workers and for black male workers but an
increase in job stability for women, especially more-educated women
(McMurrer 1996; Swinnerton and Wial 1995; Diebold et al. 1997;
Marcotte 1994; Rose 1995; Farber 1995).  Job turnover rates decreased
for women over the period of 1975–1995 (from 32.7 to 27.9 percent)
but increased for men (from 25.7 to 26.7 percent) (Stewart 1998).
Bernhardt et al. (1999) examined job turnover for young men using
data from the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) through 1994.
They found an increase in job instability for young white men in the
1980s and early 1990s, as compared with their counterparts in the late
1960s and 1970s.  Some of the increase is associated with lower mar-
riage rates in recent years, as well as the trend towards longer school
enrollment.  The shift of the U.S. economy to the service sector—
where jobs are generally more unstable—has also played a role.  There
has also been a decline in job security in manufacturing industries,
probably connected with the decline in employment in those industries.  
Valletta (1999) used PSID data for the years 1976–1993, combined
with CPS data for the same and previous years, to measure job change.
He found evidence consistent with declining employment security for
all men and for skilled white-collar women.  The negative effect of job
tenure on the probability of dismissals has weakened over time, as has
the corresponding negative effect on quits.  The negative tenure effect
on dismissal probabilities is reduced by employment decline in the
worker’s current industry.
Permanent job loss
Statistics on job tenure and job retention rates provide evidence on
the stability of jobs but do not necessarily provide information on the
job risks that workers bear.  Job tenure and job retention are affected by
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both employer decisions to hire or fire and by worker decisions to stay
or leave.
To study changes in job security more precisely requires isolating
the effects of decisions by employers that directly affect job security.
This question can be examined using measures of job loss.  Events
such as plant closings, an employer going out of business, or a layoff
from which the worker was not recalled are considered job displace-
ment, permanent job loss, or involuntary separation.   One such mea-
sure is the percentage of the total labor force comprised of individuals
whose employment ended involuntarily and who are not on temporary
layoff.  Excluding laid-off workers who expect to return to their previ-
ous jobs isolates those workers affected by involuntary permanent job
loss.  This measure includes individuals fired for cause, but they repre-
sent a small share of the total.
The concept of focusing on layoffs or involuntary job losses when
discussing job insecurity has some appeal, but firms may also wish to
reduce employment by encouraging workers to quit by reducing or
failing to raise wages.  On average, displaced workers suffer real wage
losses even before they are displaced (Jacobsen, LaLonde, and Sullivan
1993).
Involuntary job loss.  A total of 3.6 million workers were dis-
placed between January 1995 and December 1997 from jobs they had
held for at least 3 years.  The number of displaced workers declined
from 4.2 million in the previous survey of displaced workers, which
covered the period from January 1993 to December 1995.  Nearly half
of the workers in the 1995–1997 survey cited plant or company clos-
ings as the reason for their job loss.  Compared to the prior survey
period, the risk of job loss had fallen for virtually every worker group,
and workers displaced during 1995–1997 were more likely to be reem-
ployed at the time of the survey and less likely to be unemployed.  In
the 1995–1997 survey, displaced workers who eventually found jobs
spent fewer weeks without work than those who lost jobs in the previ-
ous survey.  Earnings losses of workers who lost jobs during 1995–
1997 were less severe than those measured in the prior survey (U.S.
Department of Labor 1999a).  Thus, there is considerable evidence
that, consistent with unemployment being near a 30-year low, job
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instability in the mid 1990s had declined as compared with earlier in
the 1990s (see Tables 2.2 and 2.3).
Table 2.2 Displacement Rates for Workers Age 20 and Older, 1981–1996 
(% of workforce) 
Table 2.3 Displacement Rates for Different Demographic Groups, 1981–
1996 (% of workforce)









SOURCE: Computations from the Displaced Worker Survey by Hipple (1999).
Year Men Women White Black
1981–82 4.3 3.4 3.8 4..8
1983–84 3.2 2.9 3.9 3.9
1985–86 3.3 3.4 3.1 3.4
1987–88 2.0 2.4 2.4 2.0
1989–90 3.2 2.8 3.0 3.5
1991–92 4.1 3.5 3.8 3.8
1993–94 3.4 3.2 3.3 3.5
1995–96 2.8 3.2 3.0 3.7
SOURCE: Computations from the Displaced Worker Survey by Hipple (1999).
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A number of studies have examined the longer term trends.  Farber
(1997, 1999) and Gardner (1995) examined whether involuntary job
loss increased in the early 1990s.  Both studied data from the 1980s
and 1990s from the Dislocated Workers Supplements to the CPS and
both found that the rate of job displacement in the early 1990s equaled
or slightly exceeded that in the early 1980s, even though the latter was
a period of deep recession.
Farber found that job loss rates did not decline as much as might
have been expected in the 1990s given the sustained expansion.  For
example, the amount by which the job loss rate exceeded the unem-
ployment rate averaged 1.2 percentage points in 1987–1989 and 3.2
percentage points in 1993–1995.  The gap fell to 2.2 percentage points
in 1995–1997 but remained higher than in the 1980s.
Farber found that job loss attributable to abolition of a position or
shift grew from 11–12 percent of all job loss in the 1980s to 17 percent
of job loss in 1991–1993.  Similarly, Gardner found that the percentage
of workers with at least three years of job tenure who were displaced in
the early 1990s equals the percentage in the early 1980s.
Although these studies found little or no change between displace-
ment rates in the two periods, the job displacements in the early 1980s
occurred during a severe economic downturn.  The displacements in
the early 1990s, however, occurred during a mild recession, when dis-
placement rates would have been expected to be considerably lower. 
Farber (1997) found that most of the increase in job displacement
during the early 1990s could be attributed to the increase in the per-
centage of workers who reported that they were displaced due to the
abolition of their shift or position; in other words, what is commonly
called “downsizing.”  The three-year job loss rate for position/shift
abolished increased from 1.3 percent for 1981–1983 to 2.3 percent for
1991–1993.  This increase occurred primarily for workers with at least
a college education (up from 1.2 percent to 2.8 percent).  In contrast,
there was no general increase in displacement rates for other reasons.
The rate of job loss due to plant closing has been relatively steady, and
the rate of job loss due to slack work has fluctuated cyclically.
Polsky (1996) examined the trend in job loss using PSID data.  He
compared the 1976–1981 period with the 1986–1991 period.  He found
little change in job separations, but a larger fraction of separations in
the later period were due to job loss.  Workers aged 45–54 suffered a
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disproportionate increase in involuntary job loss between the two peri-
ods.  Further, the reemployment probabilities for job losers decreased
but not for job quitters.  Job losers became more likely to suffer a large
decrease in earnings, while quitters became more likely to have an
increase in earnings.  Thus, he found that job loss became more com-
mon in the early 1990s, and its consequences became more costly.
Borsjoly, Duncan, and Smeeding (1998) used PSID data to study
the incidence of involuntary job loss among prime-age men (ages 25–
59).  They focused only on workers with substantial labor force attach-
ment (held a job at least one year, worked at least 1,000 hours previous
year, and not self-employed).  They argued that changes in job instabil-
ity are particularly important with respect to this group, which has rela-
tively high job stability.  They found that the incidence of job loss in
this group increased considerably over the 1968–1992 period.  It
increased about as much for college-educated workers and older work-
ers as for less educated and less experienced workers.    
Gottschalk and Moffitt (1999) used the Survey of Income and Pro-
gram Participation (SIPP) data to examine the year-to-year probability
of job change as well as the monthly probability of job change for
employed married males.  These data do not show an increase in job
turnover during the 1980s and 1990s.  While job exit rates increased
sharply in 1994, they decreased equally sharply in 1995, leaving exit
rates at roughly the same level as a decade earlier.  They also examined
various indicators of increased insecurity, including the probability that
a job ends involuntarily, is followed by a spell of nonemployment, or
that the subsequent job has lower wages.  None of these indicators of
insecurity showed an upward trend in their data.  Their results may be
consistent with a decline in job security during the early 1990s fol-
lowed by an increase towards the end of the decade.   
Together, these studies generally indicate that the rate of employer-
induced job instability was significantly higher in the early 1990s than
would be expected based on the past relationship between job instabil-
ity and macroeconomic conditions.  In this period, job instability was
higher than during the 1980s, but job loss declined in the mid 1990s.  
Plant closings.  Plant closings as a form of involuntary job loss
may differ in their effects on workers from other causes of displace-
ment.  Hamermesh, Cordes, and Goldfarb (1987), using the PSID, pre-
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sented evidence that layoffs due to plant closings are less likely to be
anticipated by workers than other layoffs.  For this reason, the effects
of plant closings on workers may be more serious than other forms of
involuntary job loss.  They found that the wage-tenure profile is much
steeper among workers whose plants closed than it is for those who
were permanently laid off.  This finding suggests that, in addition to the
compensating differential for the risk of layoff, workers who actually
are laid off anticipate some of their risk and respond by reducing their
investment in firm-specific human capital.  The same pattern of antici-
pation and consequent reduction in human capital investment does not
appear for workers who lose their jobs as a result of plant closings. 
Corporate downsizing.   As mentioned earlier, Farber (1997)
found evidence of increased job displacement due to downsizing.  Pre-
sumably related to this phenomenon, CPS data show that managerial
and professional workers became increasingly vulnerable to job loss
between the early 1980s and the early 1990s.  The share of all displace-
ments from workers in these occupations increased from 13 percent in
1981–1983 to 24 percent in 1991–1993.
In addition to an increase in the overall incidence of displacement
of managers and professionals relative to total displacement, the earn-
ings patterns of these displaced managers and professionals were also
markedly different during the two periods.  In the early 1980s, manag-
ers and professionals toward the bottom of the earnings distribution
were disproportionately likely to be displaced.  More recently, how-
ever, the earnings profile of the displaced is almost identical to that of
all employed managers and professionals.  This appears to be a part of
the pattern of an increased cost of job instability.  For managers and
professionals, being at the top of the earnings ladder appears to provide
less protection against job loss than it once did (U.S. Department of
Labor 1995a).
Unemployment duration.   Baumol and Wolf (1996) found that
the duration of unemployment remained fairly constant in the 1950s,
1960s, and 1970s and rose in the 1980s and early 1990s.  When the
data are disaggregated by age, the duration of unemployment increased
for older workers and decreased for younger workers from the 1980s to
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the 1990s, indicating an increase in the cost of job instability for older
workers.   
Conclusions on Wage and Job Instability
The overall job tenure statistics suggest that job instability has
increased slightly.  Disaggregating the data by gender suggests, how-
ever, that the increase in female tenure resulting from greater labor
force attachment is masking an increase in job instability, with job ten-
ure of males declining.
A closer examination of the evidence using data on worker dis-
placement indicates that job displacement has increased, at least for
prime-age males up to the early 1990s.  Involuntary job loss increased
both as a share of overall job loss and relative to the size of the work-
force.
Increased job displacement and decreased job tenure have occurred
among groups for whom job insecurity is relatively costly.  The
increase in the cost of job insecurity is explored in greater depth in the
next section.
The Increasing Cost of Job Loss
Perhaps a reason that worker worry over job insecurity may have
increased, at least during the early and mid 1990s, is that job insecurity
for more workers occurs later in life when it is more costly.  It is also
occurring increasingly for white-collar, managerial workers who may
have considerable investments in firm-specific human capital.    
In a study of displaced workers in Massachusetts, Kodrzycki
(1996) found that older and more experienced workers tended to have
longer unemployment periods and lower wage replacement rates when
they returned to work.  It is possible these extended periods of unem-
ployment may be a result of age discrimination, and possibly because
of shorter expected tenure duration at hire, older workers have more
difficulty than younger workers in finding new employment.
A substantial literature uses the Displaced Worker Survey to study
the postdisplacement employment and earnings experience of dis-
placed workers.  Displaced workers generally experience substantial
periods of unemployment and their earnings on jobs held after dis-
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placement are substantially lower than predisplacement earnings.  The
earnings loss suffered by workers is positively related to tenure on the
predisplacement job.
Polsky (1996) used the PSID to examine changes in the cost of job
loss between 1976–1981 and 1986–1991.  Controlling for personal
characteristics, he found a statistically significant decline in the proba-
bility of reemployment of 6.1 percentage points between the two peri-
ods and an increase of 2.3 percentage points in wage losses with job
loss between the two periods.  Workers who experienced a significant
increase in wage losses with job loss between the periods examined
include older workers, professional and managerial workers, and high-
tenure workers.
Farber (1999) found that proportional wage losses of job losers are
lower in the most recent period he examined (1995–1997) for all work-
ers except those in the lowest educational category.  Thus, the cost of
job loss declined for the average worker that lost a job towards the end
of the 1990s.
Because of their accumulation of firm-specific human capital, the
wage loss from a layoff and subsequent hire by a different employer is
greater for workers in the peak earnings years than for younger work-
ers.  Hamermesh, Cordes, and Goldfarb (1987), using the PSID, esti-
mated that involuntary separation causes a loss of firm-specific human
capital equivalent to more than six months’ wages.  The value in terms
of months’ wages is higher for high-wage workers at the peak of their
earnings profiles.  Thus, the value of lost earnings is large, especially
for employees with long tenure who are still years away from retire-
ment.  Data on worker displacement suggest that long tenured workers
displaced due to the closing, reorganization, or relocation of a business
or plant typically suffer larger earnings losses after displacement than
do otherwise similar workers displaced with short tenure (Carrington
1993).
Because of their accumulation of human capital, their loss due to
depreciation of human capital during unemployment is also greater.
Human capital depreciates during unemployment as workers’ skills
and knowledge erode.  Perhaps in part for this reason, Farber (1999)
found that high tenure workers suffer dramatically larger earnings
declines than do workers with less tenure.
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Job insecurity is particularly serious for midcareer workers in their
forties and early fifties for a number of additional reasons.  These
workers often have financial responsibilities for families and fixed
financial commitments for mortgages and children’s education.  The
increase in job loss at higher tenure has thus increased the cost of the
risk of job loss for workers.
The forties and fifties are also particularly costly ages for workers
to lose pension coverage.  The pension wealth loss caused by a separa-
tion from a job providing a defined benefit plan is greatest for a worker
roughly 10 years from retirement (Turner 1993).  At that point, the
worker has accumulated substantial pension wealth, but that wealth is
generally based on the nominal value of his or her final wage.  Inflation
could erode the real value of the final wage over a 10-year period.
Thus, a worker aged 50 losing a job with a defined benefit plan could
suffer a large pension wealth loss.
A further reason for the increase in the cost of job loss is the
increase in permanent job loss relative to temporary job loss.  Davis,
Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996, p. 138) found that the dominant role of
permanent layoffs in the recession of the early 1990s suggests that job
destruction persistence rates were high during that recession.  The phe-
nomena of prolonged, persistent job destruction and the larger role of
permanent layoffs since the early 1980s are linked to the rise in long-
term joblessness.
U.S.–CANADIAN COMPARISONS
Job Creation and Destruction
While job tenure and job turnover statistics present job instability
from the viewpoint of the worker, job creation and destruction look at
the process from the viewpoint of the employer.   Job creation refers to
the number of jobs created at plants where employment is growing and
job destruction to the number of jobs ended at plants where employ-
ment is shrinking.  Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996, p. 21) com-
pared job creation and destruction rates in Canada and the United
States.  The rates they used for Canada were for the 1979–1984 period;
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the rates for the United States were for the longer 1973–1988 period.
The rates for both countries are for manufacturing firms.  The job cre-
ation rate was higher at in Canada (10.6 percent versus 9.1 percent), and
the job destruction rate was slightly lower in Canada as well (10.0 per-
cent versus 10.2 percent). There was little difference between the two
job destruction rates, which are the source of worker job insecurity.  
The authors found that only one-third of U.S. job destruction is
accounted for by establishments that shrink by less than 25 percent
over a year.  Thus, the bulk of job destruction cannot be accommodated
by normal rates of worker attrition resulting from retirements and quits.
Most of the job destruction represents job loss from the point of view
of workers.  The authors also found that annual job destruction prima-
rily reflects persistent establishment-level changes, so that the bulk of
job destruction cannot be implemented by temporary layoff and recall.
Most of the job destruction they measured reflects permanent job loss. 
Baldwin, Dunne, and Haltiwanger (1994) also compared job
destruction in Canada and the United States.  They found that the
Canadian and United States industry-level job destruction data are
remarkably similar.  Industries with high job destruction rates in Can-
ada also have high rates in the United States, and similarly for indus-
tries with low job destruction rates.  In addition, they found that the
overall magnitudes of gross job flows in the two countries are similar.
Further, they found that the time-series patterns of job destruction are
similar in the two countries.  In both countries, job destruction is much
more cyclically volatile than job creation.  This asymmetry, however, is
more pronounced in the United States, giving some evidence that job
insecurity is greater in the United States.
Wage Flexibility
Cousineau (1987) compared wage flexibility in Canada, the United
States, and Japan.  He found that wages in Canada and the United
States are more rigid than in Japan, but that Canada has more flexible
wages than the United States.  He hypothesized that Canada has more
flexible wages because it has a relatively small, open economy that is
sensitive to international markets, in particular to the U.S. market.  He
found that wages in the sectors where exports are at least 25 percent of
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industry gross domestic product were highly positively correlated with
U.S. output over the period from 1967 to 1984.     
Employment Protection
An employment protection index has been created by the OECD
based on the strength of the legal framework governing hiring and fir-
ing.  Legal restrictions on hiring and firing may reduce job uncertainty
for those workers having a job, but they also tend to reduce employ-
ment because of the inflexibility of the employment commitment by
employers.  Among 20 OECD countries, the United States ranked the
lowest in terms of employment protection, followed by New Zealand
and Canada (OECD 1994).  Thus, in comparison with other OECD
countries, Canada and the United States offer similar amounts of job
protection through legal restrictions governing firing.
Advance notice is intended to reduce the risk associated with lay-
off by giving workers the opportunity to begin the search for a new job
sooner, while still employed.  In all Canadian jurisdictions, there are
minimum requirements for notice of a dismissal without cause.
Employers, however, may make wage payments in lieu of the notice
period.  Firing rules, working-time rules, short-time work arrange-
ments, and regulations concerning atypical contracts are all aspects of
Canadian employment protection legislation (den Broeder and Gelauff
1997).
In the United States, the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notifi-
cation Act of 1989 requires employers with 100 or more full-time
employees to give 60 days’ notice of a plant closing or a layoff that is
planned to last at least six months and that involves at least one-third of
the employer’s workforce or 500 workers (whichever is less).  Some
evidence, however, indicates that this act has not increased the provi-
sion of advanced notice to displaced workers (Addison and Blackburn
1994).
Unemployment and Unemployment Compensation
Unemployment rates, which were nearly equal in the two countries
in the 1950s and 1960s, were markedly higher in Canada in the 1980s
and 1990s.  Over the period of 1989–1994, the unemployment rate
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averaged 9.8 percent in Canada and 6.2 percent in the United States.  In
Canada, 24 percent of the labor force was unemployed at some point
during 1993, compared with 15 percent of the U.S. labor force (Com-
mission for Labor Cooperation 1997).
The unemployment rate has trended downwards in the United
States.  It peaked at 9.7 percent in 1982 and had fallen to less than 4.0
percent in the early 2000s.
The Canadian unemployment system is more generous, which may
account for higher unemployment rates in Canada.  The unemployment
compensation system in Canada is more generous than the system in
the United States primarily because of its less restrictive eligibility
requirements and longer duration of benefits.  Unemployment benefits
are available for more than 40 weeks in Canada, as opposed to only 26
weeks in the United States, although the U.S. federal government often
extends benefit durations in major recessions.  Less restrictive eligibil-
ity rules imply that a larger share of unemployed workers are eligible
for benefits in Canada than in the United States.  Finally, the take-up
rate among those eligible for benefits is higher in Canada.  About half
of unemployed workers in Canada in 1994 and 35 percent of unem-
ployed workers in the United States from March 1995 to March 1996
received unemployment insurance benefits (Commission on Labor
Cooperation 1997).  For reasons poorly understood by policy analysts,
many American workers fail to apply for the benefits available to them.
Unemployment insurance is not experience rated in Canada, while
it is in the United States.  The cost to Canadian employers of laying off
workers is less than it is for American employers.   Thus, the higher
unemployment rates in Canada do not necessarily indicate greater
income insecurity, taking into account social insurance. 
THEORIES AS TO WHY JOB INSECURITY
HAS INCREASED
Many theories have been proposed in the empirical studies as to
why aspects of job insecurity have increased in Canada and the United
States, at least through the early 1990s.  We divide these theories into
three groups: 1) macroeconomic theories, 2) employer-based (labor
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demand) theories, and 3) worker-based (labor supply) theories.  Thir-
teen of the fourteen hypotheses present reasons why job and wage
instability would be expected to increase.  The first hypothesis presents
a reason why they would be expected to decrease.     
Macroeconomic or Economy-wide Theories 
Declining macroeconomic instability
Some evidence indicates that the severity and possibly the duration
of economic downturns have decreased.  These decreases could be due
to improved macroeconomic management of the economy, fortuitous
changes in the severity of economic shocks, or other reasons not well
understood.
Increased international trade
Both the United States and Canadian economies have increasingly
opened to international trade.  In 1995, Canadian exports accounted for
42 percent of GDP, up from 28 percent in 1988; U.S. exports accounted
for 12 percent of GDP, up from 9 percent in 1988 (Commission for
Labor Cooperation 1997).
International economic integration increases the exposure of an
economy to external risk and to greater competition from foreign pro-
ducers.  Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) explored the effect of
international trade on job destruction and creation.  They found a high
rate of gross job destruction in the United States among industries with
a high import penetration ratio, as measured by imports as a percentage
of imports plus domestic production.  They speculated that this job
destruction occurs because import-intensive manufacturing industries
in the United States tend to pay relatively low wages and have rela-
tively unskilled workforces.  These types of industries tend to have
higher rates of gross job destruction than do high-wage industries.  To
test this hypothesis, they examined the relationship between four-digit
industry excess reallocation rates and measures of trade exposure.
Excess job reallocation rates are measured as the difference between
gross job reallocation (the sum of all plant-level gains and losses that
occur over a time period) and the absolute value of net employment
change.  Regression analysis indicated that, after controlling for the
level of wage rates in the industry, there was no significant relationship
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between excess job reallocation and measures of export or import
intensity. 
Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) focused on the demand of
domestic and foreign consumers, and argued on theoretical grounds
that the relationship between trade exposure and labor demand volatil-
ity is ambiguous.  International trade exposes the U.S. economy to
demand disturbances that originate in other economies, but it also
reduces the importance of effects of domestic product demand distur-
bances on U.S. producers.
Considerable evidence shows that as imports become more com-
petitive, domestic industry displacement rises (Kletzer 1998a, b; Have-
man 1994; Addison, Fox, and Ruhm 1995).  Haveman estimated that a
1 percent decline in industry import price from one year to the next is
associated with a 1.62 percent increase in industry job displacements.
For a group of import-competing industries, he found that a 1 percent
decline in import price is associated with a 3.5 percent rise in displace-
ments.
Decreased inflation
With the rapid inflation of the 1970s, firms could deal with com-
petitive pressures by granting nominal wage increases below the rate of
inflation, thereby reducing real labor costs without nominal wage cuts
or layoffs.  This form of adjustment was less available during the 1990s
because of lower inflation.
Labor Demand
Increased competition
An overall increase in the level of competition, not just increases
due to international trade, may have contributed to greater job insecu-
rity.  Increased competition has occurred in some industries due to
deregulation.  For example, the breakup of AT&T led to the entry of
new firms and competition in an industry where jobs were once secure.
The ending of price and other regulations has enhanced competition.  
Duca (1998) argued that changes in how much competition an
industry faces relative to others may explain why profit sharing has
risen in some industries more than in others. He noted that the largest
increases in profit sharing have occurred in sectors with greater foreign
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competition, such as in manufacturing, or in deregulated sectors, such
as transportation.
Shift in bargaining power towards firms
The relatively slack labor market of the 1980s may have shifted
bargaining power between firms and workers towards firms (Morissette
1996).  The United States, however, has had low unemployment during
the mid and late 1990s, shifting the balance in the opposite direction.     
De-industrialization
The shift of jobs from the manufacturing sector to the service sec-
tor may be a factor in increasing job insecurity.  Traditionally, jobs in
the manufacturing sector have been more stable and secure than those
in the service sector.  This shift has occurred both in Canada and in the
United States.
Technological change
The effect of rapid technological change on job insecurity likely
differs between older and younger workers.  Rapid technological
change reduces the value of human capital of older workers, whose
human capital was acquired in earlier years.  For younger workers,
however, rapid technological change is incorporated in their human
capital because of their recent schooling and the greater investments in
human capital that workers make at younger ages (Baumol and Wolff
1996).
Change in employers’ philosophies
The United States and Canada have both seen a shift towards con-
servatism in political philosophies.  There may have been a similar
shift among employers away from the philosophy of paternalism and
employer-provided social welfare and towards one of individual choice
and individual responsibility.
Increased responsiveness of firms to economic conditions
Job insecurity can increase due to macroeconomic conditions or
other factors affecting the firm’s demand.  It can also increase due a
change in the response of the firm to those conditions.  Such a change
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could be a result of other factors listed, such as greater competition,
due to deregulation and increased international trade.
Labor Supply
Decreased unionism
Union members are likely to have more job security and stable
wages than nonunionized workers because of job protection and multi-
year wage contracts.  Union members accounted for 17.6 percent of the
workforce in 1993 but only 12.9 percent of the displaced workers over
the period of 1993–1995 (Yakoboski 1997).  Furthermore, job security
under collective bargaining is tied to seniority, with older workers gen-
erally having greater seniority. 
Unionization rates were comparable between Canada and the
United States in the 1950s but were twice as high in Canada by 1990.
A decline has also occurred in Canada, but it has been smaller and has
been hidden in the overall statistics by the change in the labor force
behavior of women.  The overall percentage has stagnated, ranging
from 31 percent to 33 percent between 1966 and 1993.  The unioniza-
tion rate fell from 38 percent to 35 percent for men, while it rose from
16 percent to 30 percent for women.
Both countries have seen a shift from the goods-producing sector,
where unions are well established, to the service sector, where unions
have recruitment problems.  This shift has reduced union participation.  
Between 1976 and 1992, employment declined in the Canadian
goods sector, with its proportion of workers falling from 32 percent to
24 percent.  As well, the proportion of unionized workers in that sector
fell from 43 percent to 38 percent.  In manufacturing, unionization fell
from 43 percent to 33 percent.  By contrast, total employment in the
service sector grew from 68 percent to 76 percent of the workforce, and
unionization in the service sector increased from 26 percent to 32 per-
cent.  The most heavily unionized part of the Canadian (and U.S.)
economy is the public sector, where unionization rose from 69 percent
in 1976 to 75 percent in 1993 (Galarneau 1996). 
Verma and Thompson (1988) argued that Canadian and American
managements responded differently to the market pressures of the
1980s.  While many U.S. managers worked to develop a parallel non-
union employment system, Canadian managers worked largely within
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collective bargaining.  They concluded that managerial choice contrib-
uted to a decline of the collective bargaining system in the United
States, while it had the opposite effect in Canada.
Decline in real income
Real incomes have declined for low-wage workers in the United
States, though by exactly how much is unclear because the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) has overstated inflation.  Declining real incomes may
have caused declining worker demand for employer-provided insur-
ance.
The increase in two-earner families
The increase in two-earner families makes families better able to
bear financial risks and thus more willing to take them, while the
increase in divorce has had the opposite effect.  
A demand by workers for increased flexibility
Some workers may have an increased demand for flexibility
because of the changes in family structure.  Working women may
desire greater flexibility in an attempt to balance family and work
responsibilities.
The age structure of the workforce 
Some flexibility is provided employers by voluntary worker turn-
over and retirement.  The greater voluntary worker turnover and retire-
ment is, the less the risk of job insecurity.  An aging workforce would
seem to have a positive effect on job security because there would be
greater flexibility due to retirements. A labor force with a high propor-
tion of young workers would also be more flexible because there would
be greater turnover.  Thus, the demographic composition of the labor
force may affect the extent of job risk individual workers face.  A mid-
dle-aged worker would face less job insecurity in a firm with a high
proportion of its employees being young or being near retirement.
There may be an increase in job insecurity in the United States and
Canada because the large baby boom cohort is middle aged, which is
period of relatively low job turnover.
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Summary
Each of the 14 hypotheses carries some supporting evidence.
None is contradictory, and each could explain part of the changes that
have occurred.  The difficult task remains for empirical work to deter-
mine if some should be rejected and to determine the importance for
those that remain.
CONCLUSIONS
Several measures suggest that job insecurity has increased in Can-
ada and the United States, at least through the early 1990s.  This trend
appears to have reversed during the mid and late 1990s in the United
States as unemployment rates reached 30-year lows.  Even for that
period, however, job insecurity was high relative to the unemployment
rate.  The demographic pattern of job insecurity has also changed.  Job
insecurity has increased for older workers in both countries, for whom
the cost of insecurity is particularly high.  Thus, the evidence is partic-
ularly strong that the cost of job insecurity has increased.
Thirteen hypotheses for an increase in job insecurity have been
presented, although these should be interpreted as predicting the level
of job insecurity relative to the unemployment rate and the level of
aggregate demand for labor.  The decline in unionism, for example,
may be a factor in the decline in job security for middle- and lower-
income workers.  Greater international competition and greater compe-
tition due to deregulation may play a role in some industries.  More
rapid technological change may have increased job insecurity for older
workers in some occupations.  The low inflation rate may have
increased real wage inflexibility.  Greater macroeconomic stability may
play a role in reducing job insecurity, but evidence suggests that much
of job insecurity is idiosyncratic, not being related to macroeconomic
shocks.
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